A Critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" by Gitsoulis, Chrysoula
 i 
[DISSERTATION PREFACE (2008)] 
 
A Critique of Saul Kripke’s  
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 
 
Chrysoula Gitsoulis 
 
 
Almost three decades after its publication, Saul Kripke’s intriguing and controversial Wittgenstein on Rules 
and Private language (1980) (henceforth WRPL) remains one of the most important and widely read 
commentaries on §§137-242 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (henceforth PI).   
 Many factors account for the book’s enduring popularity.  One is that it is written in simple, non-
technical terms, which has made it readily accessible to a wide and diverse audience.  Another is that it 
presents a captivating argument, which appears to flow seamlessly from apparently true premises to a 
startling conclusion.  The crucial factor accounting for the book’s popularity, however, is the important 
contribution it has made both to exegetical studies on Wittgenstein and to contemporary debates 
concerning the metaphysics and epistemology of meaning and understanding.   
 As a piece of historical scholarship, WRPL offers an interpretation of Wittgenstein that is far from 
ordinary.  It represents Wittgenstein as defending a set of unified and highly provocative claims about the 
nature of meaning and understanding.  Unlike many expositions predating WRPL, which take 
Wittgenstein’s central topic of concern in his discussion of meaning and understanding in PI to be his 
famous ‘private language argument’, and locate it in §§243ff of PI, Kripke takes his central topic of concern 
to be that of ‘following a rule’ in §§137-202.  Kripke’s interpretation of these sections not only helped put 
the topic of following a rule into the philosophical limelight, but also tied together, in a novel and striking 
way, what seemed to be a series of dissociated remarks on rule-following and the attendant private 
language argument.   
 On Kripke’s reading, the conclusion of the private language argument is a ‘corollary’ of results that 
Wittgenstein already establishes in his discussion of following a rule.  More specifically, Kripke takes the 
conclusion of the private language argument to be a corollary of what he calls a ‘skeptical solution’ to a 
‘skeptical problem’ concerning the topic of following a rule.  Indeed, according to Kripke, the private 
language argument already reaches its conclusion by §202 of PI.   
 The ‘skeptical problem’, which Kripke takes to be the central problem occupying Wittgenstein’s 
attention in §§137-202, is: Is there any fact about me that constitutes what I mean by my words?  The main 
character of WRPL, an imaginary meaning skeptic, examines a range of facts that might play the requisite 
constitutive role – and so solve the skeptical problem – and shows that they cannot do the job required of 
them.  He then considers the proposal that my meaning what I do by my words is a primitive fact, and 
cannot be constituted by more basic facts, but rules this out as well.  These considerations form the 
content of what Kripke calls the ‘skeptical argument’.  On the assumption that he has examined all 
possibilities, he draws the (apparently paradoxical) ‘skeptical conclusion’ that there are no facts about me 
that correspond to my meaning what I do by my words.   
 Faced with this seemingly outrageous result (undercutting, as it apparently does, some of the most 
fundamental assumptions we make about the notions of meaning and understanding), we naturally 
incline toward the view that there must be something wrong with the argument leading to it: that it relies 
on some assumption that we can reject, or that it makes some fallacious step.  That is, we incline toward 
rejecting the skeptical conclusion, and maintaining that there must, after all, be what Kripke calls a 
‘straight solution’ to the skeptical problem: some species of fact that constitutes my meaning what I do 
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by my words, and hence that explains my applying them in the way that I do.  Kripke, however, reads 
Wittgenstein as advocating what he calls a ‘skeptical solution’: a response to the skeptical argument 
which accepts the skeptical conclusion but seeks to explain how we can rehabilitate talk of meaning in its 
light. 
 The skeptical problem, argument, and solution, have received a great deal of attention, not merely as 
interpretations of Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning and understanding, but also in their own right.  
Many contemporary philosophers of mind and language are familiar with the skeptical problem, and have 
tried to offer a straight solution to it.  Kripke’s book makes an important contribution to efforts to ‘solve’ 
it, by ushering into contemporary debates the most important insights he takes Wittgenstein to offer on 
it.  Ultimately, on Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein, the skeptical problem has no straight solution.  This 
result proved to be extremely contentious for many contemporary philosophers of mind and language, 
most of whom maintain that there is a straight solution to the skeptical problem.  Not surprisingly, WRPL 
gave rise to a wave of controversy, which continues to this day. 
 Efforts to solve the problems arising from these debates have not been entirely disconnected from the 
historical Wittgenstein’s writings; indeed, WRPL has prompted many contemporary philosophers of mind 
and language to revisit Wittgenstein’s work to ferret out whatever insights he might have had on them.  
This, in turn, has helped bridge the gap between Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning and understanding 
and contemporary discussions of these topics.  We can think of WRPL as a stepping stone between these 
domains.  If Wittgenstein’s discussion of meaning and understanding is taken more seriously in 
philosophy of mind and language today than in the past, the credit is due in large part to WRPL.     
 Both of these factors – WRPL’s departure from standard expositions in its reading of Wittgenstein, and 
the radical theses WRPL establishes in its own right -- are responsible for the book’s enduring popularity.  
And, of course, enhancing the book’s appeal is the fact that Kripke defends many of his central 
contentions with force and an abundance of insights. 
 Though WRPL, like its predecessor Naming and Necessity (1972), has been widely read, its content has 
not been taken up as favorably; indeed, the general consensus has been that the arguments of WRPL are 
flawed both in their own right and as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.  Colin McGinn, for example, in 
the Preface to his book, Wittgenstein on Meaning, writes: ‘When I first read Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private language, it seemed to me to make clear sense, at last, of Wittgenstein’s text… In the 
course of rereading Wittgenstein with Kripke’s interpretation in mind I came, to my surprise, to have 
considerable doubts about the correctness of that interpretation … At the same time, I began to think that 
the arguments Kripke develops were less impregnable than had first appeared to me.’  Many 
commentators on WRPL have voiced similar remarks/reactions.   
 It seems to me, however, that the negative reception of WRPL rests on a number of critical textual 
misinterpretations.  When I first read WRPL, I too thought the arguments it presented were flawed both 
in themselves and as a reading of Wittgenstein.  After a more careful reading of WRPL, however, and of 
the associated passages in PI, many of the inconsistencies that I thought were present in WRPL began to 
dissipate, and my appreciation of it as a reading of Wittgenstein intensified.  I came to understand why 
the skeptical argument took the rather unusual form it did, and that together with the skeptical solution, 
it forms a very good interpretation of the associated passages in PI.  I also came to realize that most 
commentators failed to see this because, in some fundamental way, they misrepresented the content of 
WRPL: quoting passages out of context, omitting or distorting important parts of arguments, interpreting 
key expressions in ways not intended by Kripke, creating dialogue that is not present in the text, 
frequently affirming their opinion by corroborating the interpretive errors of others, and, most 
importantly, failing to distinguish two characters in WRPL -- Kripke’s skeptic (who plays the role of the 
interlocutor in PI), and Kripke’s Wittgenstein (who plays the role of Wittgenstein) – thereby putting 
words into the mouth of the wrong character.  Given that I thought the book had many valuable insights 
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to offer that were being lost in the tangle of interpretive errors, I thought it well worth attempting to clear 
them up.  That task is taken up in Chapter 1, where I present a detailed exposition of the skeptical 
problem, argument, and solution.  In Chapter 2, I evaluate the skeptical argument in its own right.  And 
finally, in Chapters 3 and 4, I examine how well the skeptical argument and solution fare as an 
interpretation of Wittgenstein.   
 I take these tasks to be important for several reasons.  To begin with, regardless of whether or to what 
extent the skeptical argument has its source in PI, it demands careful evaluation in its own right, since it 
threatens to deplete our concepts of ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’ of content, and thereby to undermine 
our everyday folk-psychological practices that depend on these notions; and it is not apparent that the 
skeptical solution can do the needed resuscitative work.   
 It is important to note that when I say the skeptical argument demands careful evaluation ‘in its own 
right’, I do not mean that I will not rely on PI in interpreting it.  For I do not think the task of assessing 
the skeptical argument can be properly executed without appealing to the sections of PI which it is 
intended to illuminate.  In fact, persistent failures to do this have, I think, been mainly responsible for the 
skewed readings of the argument.   
 It is not only the work of evaluating the skeptical argument in its own right that will precipitate us into 
PI, of course, but also, and necessarily, the task of assessing how well WRPL fares as an interpretation of 
PI.  I take this task to also be important, for several reasons.  For one thing, I have found that assessing 
WRPL as a reading of PI helps bring some of the most difficult passages of Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
rule-following into sharp focus.  It also helps us develop a greater appreciation for Wittgenstein’s 
perspective on the skeptical problem, to the extent that we can locate it in PI, and other problems of a 
similar nature -- a perspective which, I believe, contains many important morals.1  
 In WRPL, as very often in Wittgenstein’s works, a problem is presented and, quite naturally, 
erroneously interpreted.  In WRPL, it is the skeptic (who plays the role of Wittgenstein’s interlocutor) who 
is guilty of the false interpretation, and, on the basis of this error, he generates what Wittgenstein would 
call a ‘pseudo-problem’, since it is based on a false interpretation.  Repeated attempts are made to solve it, 
to no avail.  The skeptic then concludes that the problem has no solution; indeed, his false interpretation 
causes him to draw an even stronger conclusion that appears to be paradoxical.  At this point Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein enters the scene, and offers a way out of the seeming paradox: a ‘skeptical solution’.  This 
involves describing actual linguistic practice, to help us see why no direct solution to the pseudo-problem 
is necessary or possible.  The moral to be drawn is that the pseudo-problem is not in need of solution, but 
of dissolution.   
 I take this to be the central interpretive thesis of WRPL, a thesis that has been lost sight of in the 
literature, and I think it is essentially correct as an interpretation of Wittgenstein.  In chapters 3 and 4, I 
offer my defense of this claim.  Wittgenstein once wrote: ‘A human being is imprisoned in a room, if the 
door is unlocked but opens inward; he, however, never gets the idea of pulling instead of pushing against 
it.’ [RFM III, 37] In similar vein, I try to show that the reason the skeptical problem, as interpreted by the 
skeptic, baffles us and frustrates attempts to solve it, is that we have been pushing against a door that 
only opens by pulling it.  Pushing against the door is trying to give it a straight solution.  Pulling it is 
offering a skeptical solution.  I try to bring this out in Chapter 4 by situating the skeptical problem, as 
interpreted by the skeptic, and the skeptical solution, into a larger framework concerning Wittgenstein’s 
so-called ‘metaphilosophy’ (remarks concerning the practice of philosophy), that deals with his 
identification and treatment of pseudo-philosophical problems.  Kripke maintains that the conclusion of 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 
of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently developed 
                                                 
1 Here, I agree with Crispin Wright [1989a p. 157] that ‘there are still rich seems of philosophy, which we have failed to mine only by digging 
insufficiently deep’. 
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argument in §§243ff of PI, as most commentators take it to be.  I go a step further in Chapter 4 and try to 
show that Wittgenstein’s remarks on following-a-rule in §§137-202 of PI are a corollary of his 
‘metaphilosophical’ remarks in §§107-136 of PI, which immediately precede his discussion of following-a-
rule; they are, in other words, but one application/illustration of his philosophical method.  I also defend 
the correctness of Kripke’s interpretation of the rule-following remarks, which see Wittgenstein as 
developing a skeptical argument and solution, by showing that this interpretation squares with and 
supports the metaphilosophical framework to be presented.  A crucial goal of this project is thus not only 
to clarify the relation between Wittgenstein’s remarks on following-a-rule and the private language 
argument, but the more fundamental relation between Wittgenstein’s philosophical method and his 
remarks on following-a-rule.  If Kripke’s discussion helped put the topic of following-a-rule into sharp 
focus, by linking it to the private language argument, then my hope is to sharpen that focus a bit further, 
so as to illuminate the fundamental role that Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy plays in his discussion of 
following-a-rule.   
 That, then, is a broad overview of the plan and motivation for this project.  I turn now to more specific 
details of content. 
 
  
Chapter 1 
 
In §§137-242 of PI, Kripke interprets Wittgenstein as wrestling with the following problem about 
meaning: Is there any fact about me that constitutes what I mean by a word?  This problem is developed by 
Kripke in WRPL in terms of an example from arithmetic.  Suppose, the example runs, that I am given a 
computation that I have never performed before – say, ‘68+57=?’.  I then perform the computation, 
obtaining ‘125’ as my answer, and after checking my work, I am confident that ‘125’ is the correct answer.  
Now suppose, Kripke continues, a ‘bizarre skeptic’ comes along who questions my confidence.  ‘What fact 
about you makes it the case that, as you used “+” in the past, the answer you meant or intended for 
“68+57” should have been 125 rather than, say, 5?’ he asks. [p. 8]2 ‘Perhaps’, he continues, ‘as you used the 
term “+” in the past, you meant some nonstandard function’, which he calls ‘quus’, and defines as follows: 
 
              x⊕y =   x+y if x, y < 57 
                = 5 otherwise 
 
If I meant quus by ‘+’ in the past, then the answer I intended for ‘68 + 57’ should have been ‘5’, so that, if I 
am to accord with my past intentions, the answer I should now give is ‘5’.  What fact makes it the case 
(makes it true) that I meant plus and not quus?  This is the skeptical problem, and in section 1.1, I try to 
clarify in further detail the nature of this problem.      
 The skeptical argument developed by Kripke in Chapter 2 of WRPL proceeds by canvassing a range of 
candidate straight solutions to the skeptical problem.  These include the following:   
 
 [A]  A ‘rule’ coming ‘before my mind’ that ‘tells me’ how to apply ‘+’ in all future cases. [p. 15-16, 
22] 
 [B]  An introspectible qualitative state of consciousness, such as an image or sensation, 
present when performing additions. [p. 41-51] 
 [C]  A disposition to give the right answer, i.e., to say that had I been queried about any question 
of the form ‘x+y=?’, I would have answered with the sum. [p. 22-40] 
 
                                                 
2 All bracketed page number references are to WRPL, unless otherwise indicated. 
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The body of the skeptical argument consists in the skeptic’s examination and rejection of these candidate 
straight solutions, along with the proposal that meaning so-and-so w is a ‘primitive’ fact.3 [p. 41-42, 51-
53] Assuming that these facts exhaust the possibilities, he concludes that there are no facts that 
correspond to my meaning addition rather than quaddition by ‘+’, or indeed anything by any word, since the 
conclusion generalizes to any word.   
 In section 1.2, I fill in the details of the skeptical argument, and the pivotal role that the so-called 
‘justification constraint’ introduced by Kripke’s skeptic plays in his rejection of the facts considered.  On 
the interpretation I offer, that constraint can be summed up as follows:   
 
 [JI] F justifies my applying word w thus and so, given what I mean by it, if and only if (1) I have 
direct (non-inferential) access to F, and (2) I can deduce a priori from F that I ought to apply w 
thus and so. 
  
In Chapter 3 of WRPL, Kripke outlines what he calls a ‘skeptical solution’ to the skeptical problem.  
There are two components to the ‘skeptical solution’.  On the one hand, unlike a ‘straight solution’, the 
skeptical solution is not intended to refute the conclusion of the skeptical argument.  What makes the 
position ‘skeptical’ is that it accepts the conclusion of the skeptical argument: 
 
 [SC] For any subject S, there is no fact about S that corresponds to his meaning addition by ‘+’ (or 
anything by any word). 
 
What makes it a ‘solution’ is that it nevertheless defends our ordinary practice of ascribing meaning and 
understanding to each other.4  According to the skeptical solution, our ordinary practice of ascribing 
meanings to each other is not undermined by [SC], for, contrary appearances notwithstanding, it is not 
jeopardized by the failure of any fact to justify our applications of words in the way ([JI]) demanded by the 
skeptic:  
 There are at least two delicate issues regarding the skeptical solution that stand in need of clarification. 
 One issue concerns the very coherence of the skeptical conclusion [SC].  On the face of it, [SC] appears to 
be self-undermining: if there is no fact about S that his meaning addition by ‘+’ (or anything by any word) 
corresponds to, for any subject S, then how can anyone succeed in stating the skeptical conclusion without 
contradicting himself?   
 It all depends on how we interpret the skeptical conclusion.  A number of interpretations have been 
offered in the literature; among them some of the following: 
  
 [a]  (Radical skepticism) All words are meaningless.  
 [b] (Error theory) All meaning-ascriptions are false.   
 [c]  (Expressivism) Truth/falsity and factuality/non-factuality is not properly predicable of 
meaning-ascriptions.     
 [d] (Anti-individualism) Meaning-ascriptions cannot be analyzed in terms of facts about the 
subject alone.   
 [e]  (Anti-reductivism) Meaning-ascriptions cannot be analyzed in terms of any collection of 
natural, non-semantic facts.  
 
In section §1.3.1, I flesh out each of these interpretations.  Among them, only [a] - [c] are self-defeating or 
                                                 
3 Kripke defines this as a state ‘not to be assimilated with sensations or headaches or any “qualitative” state, nor to be assimilated to 
dispositions, but a state of a unique kind of its own’. [p. 51-53] 
4 I follow Scott Soames [1998 p. 313] in this interpretation of the terms ‘skeptical’ and ‘solution’.   
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incoherent -- we will look at some arguments that bring this out – and, though [d] and [e] are coherent, I 
show that, along with the other candidates, they lack crucial features that Kripke attributes to the 
skeptical conclusion.  The target conclusion, I try to show, is [f]. 
  
 [f]  There is no state of an agent, analyzable or non-analyzable/primitive, that satisfies [JI].  
 
 The second interpretive issue that stands in need of clarification concerns the relation between the 
skeptical solution and Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ‘private-language argument’.  Kripke sees 
the conclusion of the private-language argument as a ‘corollary’ [p. 68] to the skeptical solution.  But in 
what sense is it a ‘corollary’?  In §1.3.2, I flesh out the connection.    
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Kripke raises four objections against the dispositional theory [candidate [C] above], the most promising 
straight solution, and indeed the most ardently defended in the current literature.  They may be summed 
up as follows: 
 
(1) Finitude objection: Since my actual dispositions are finite, it’s not true that if queried about any 
 two numbers I will come up with their sum, as the dispositional theory maintains, for some 
 numbers are too large for my mind to grasp.  But surely I can mean addition by ‘+’ despite the fact 
 that I don’t have dispositions to handle huge numbers.   
(2) Error objection: Any meaning-constituting fact must be able to account for the fact that some 
 people are disposed to make mistakes.  But the dispositional theory cannot account for this fact: 
 according to it, how one should apply ‘+’ is how one would apply ‘+’.  
(3) Circularity objection: The dispositional theory cannot succeed in giving a non-circular 
 description of the facts that constitute my meaning what I do by my words.  
(4) Justification objection: Any meaning-constituting fact must ‘show how I am justified’ [p. 11] 
 in giving one answer rather than another to any particular addition query.  I.e., any meaning-
 constituting fact must be such that, however in fact I am disposed to apply ‘+’, it should ‘tell me’ 
 [p. 24] how I should apply it.  But dispositions do not have this property.   
 
These objections have a common form (as will become apparent when we look at them in detail in chapter 
2): they impose a specific constraint on the dispositional theory, and then reject it as a straight solution to 
the skeptical problem for failing to meet that constraint. 
 In chapter 2, I examine and critique each objection.  The chapter is divided into four sections, 
corresponding to the four objections.  The plan for each section is as follows.   
 
 i.  I begin by laying out the argument corresponding to the objection in question, so as to 
identify the constraint that the objection imposes on the dispositional theory.   
 ii.  I then argue that the argument’s success depends on an unwarranted assumption Kripke 
makes about how the constraint is to be interpreted, and that no meaning-constituting fact 
should be required to meet the constraint thus interpreted.   
 iii.  Finally, I offer a more reasonable interpretation of the constraint in question, and try to 
show that a more refined version of the dispositional theory than that entertained by Kripke 
is invulnerable to the objection when the constraint is thus interpreted.   
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I develop this more refined version of the dispositional theory – ‘constructive dispositionalism’, as I 
call it -- in piecemeal fashion throughout chapter 2, as we deal with each objection in turn.    
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
In order to properly explain §§137-242 of PI, on which Kripke focuses his attention, we must situate them 
within the methodological framework in §§107-136 that precedes them.  The main purpose of chapter 3 is 
bring this methodological framework to light, and thus to set the stage for chapter 4, where I defend the 
claim that the skeptical problem, as the skeptic interprets it, does emerge in §§137-242 as just another 
pseudo-philosophical problem, not in need of solution, but of dissolution.  In chapter 3, I try to clarify 
Wittgenstein’s means of identifying pseudo-philosophical problems, and his means of treating them, by 
focusing on his so-called ‘meta-philosophical’ remarks in §§107-136 of PI.  There is an important analogy 
Wittgenstein develops in those sections between philosophy and medicine, which sees the practice of 
philosophy as a form of therapy, a method of healing.  Uncovering the reaches of this analogy in 
Wittgenstein’s work is one of the most fruitful and illuminating ways of explaining the aim and spirit of 
his philosophical method, and in particular, his diagnosis and treatment of pseudo-philosophical 
problems.  I try to do so in chapter 3 by addressing the following questions, and defending the stated 
answers: §3.1: Symptoms: What, for Wittgenstein, are the symptoms that are in need of philosophical 
therapy?  (Proposed answer: Conceptual tensions.)  §3.2: Diagnosis: How, for Wittgenstein, are the 
symptoms generated?  (Proposed answer: From the urge to generalize across different ‘regions of 
language’.)  §3.3: Treatment: What is the nature of Wittgenstein’s therapy?  (Proposed answer: Describing 
actual and exploring possible uses of language.) 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
In this chapter, I apply the results of chapter 3 to the problem that forms Wittgenstein’s focus of attention 
in §§137-242 of PI: What does understanding or meaning something by an expression ‘consist in’?  By 
placing a false interpretation on this problem, I try to show that the interlocutor (who plays the role of the 
skeptic in WRPL) constructs a pseudo-problem.  This pseudo-problem, I maintain, can be identified with 
the skeptic’s interpretation of the skeptical problem in WRPL.  Thus, I try to show that the skeptical 
problem does emerge in PI, but as just another pseudo-problem, not in need of solution, but of dissolution.  
Throughout §§137-153 of PI, repeated attempts are made to solve this pseudo-problem, to no avail.  It is 
mainly in these sections, I try to show, that we can locate the ‘skeptical argument’ of WRPL.  In §§154-155, 
179-183 of PI, Wittgenstein urges us to examine the kinds of circumstances in which we use the 
expressions that were falsely interpreted by the interlocutor (and led to the construction of a pseudo-
problem), and the role these expressions have in our lives.  It is in these sections, I try to show, that 
Wittgenstein presents the framework for a ‘skeptical solution’ -- a means of dissolving the pseudo-problem 
-- whose details he proceeds to fill in in §§184ff.  Thus, the overarching aim of this chapter will be to show 
that the key ingredients of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein can traced back to PI, and are 
adequately supported by it.  
